Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of a Dynamic Game Model by Miessi Sanches, F.A. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Miessi Sanches, F.A., Silva Junior, D. & Srisuma, S. (2016). Ordinary Least 
Squares Estimation of a Dynamic Game Model. International Economic Review, 57(2), pp. 
623-634. doi: 10.1111/iere.12170 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/16624/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12170
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
of a Dynamic Game Model
Fabio A. Miessi Sanchesy
University of São Paulo
Daniel Silva Juniorz
London School of Economics
Sorawoot Srisumax
University of Surrey
July 28, 2014
Abstract
The estimation of dynamic games is known to be a numerically challenging task. In this
paper we propose an alternative class of asymptotic least squares estimators to Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Denglers (2008), which includes several well known estimators in the literature as
special cases. Our estimator can be substantially easier to compute. In the leading case with
linear payo¤s specication our estimator has a familiar OLS/GLS closed-form that does not
require any optimization. When payo¤s have partially linear form, we propose a sequential esti-
mator where the parameters in the nonlinear term can be estimated independently of the linear
components, the latter can then be obtained in closed-form. We show the class of estimators we
propose and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Denglers are in fact asymptotically equivalent. Hence
there is no theoretical cost in reducing the computational burden. Our estimator appears to
perform well in a simple Monte Carlo experiment.
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1 Introduction
We consider the estimation problem for a class of dynamic games of incomplete information that
generalizes the single agent discrete Markov decision models surveyed in Rust (1994); for a recent
survey see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010). The setup is in an innite time horizon, where players
private values enter the payo¤ function additively and are independent across players, under the
conditional independence framework. A Markov equilibrium of such game can be represented by a
xed point of nonlinear equations in the space of choice probabilities and has been shown to exist
(e.g. see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)). A variety
of methods have been proposed by di¤erent authors to estimate the same class of games based on
the equilibrium condition in recent years; examples are given below. However, a common component
of these methodologies is a nonlinear optimization problem that may act as a considerable deterrent
for applied researchers to estimate dynamic games due to involved programming needs and/or long
computational time.
In this paper we propose a class of asymptotic least squares estimators constructed based on the
equilibrium condition of the game when represented in the space of payo¤s. Our work is motivated by
the well-received methodology developed in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), who propose an
e¢ cient estimator for a unifying class of estimators that includes the non-iterative pseudo-likelihood
estimator of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and the moment based estimators discussed in Pakes,
Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) as special cases. In contrast to our work, Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler use the choice probability representation of the equilibrium to construct their estimator.
Our goal is to show there is much to gain computationally using our approach with no e¢ ciency lost.
Henceforth we use the abbreviation ALSEPSD when referring to a generic estimator of Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler.
We claim our estimator can be substantially easier to compute than ALSEPSD. In the leading case
our estimator has a familiar OLS/GLS closed-form expression when the per-period payo¤ function
takes a linear-in-parameter specication.1 In an intermediate case when the payo¤ function has an
additive partially linear form, Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem can be applied so the parameters in the
nonlinear part can be estimated rst (dimensional reduction), and the linear-in-parameter component
1The linear payo¤s structure may seem restrictive, but it is in fact quite general as it includes any nonlinear (basis)
functions of observables; albeit perhaps with an atheoretic avor. However, linear specication arises naturally in
many applications, and/or does not cause much concern in terms of structural interpretability in other situations.
A leading example for the latter is when the goal of an empirical analysis is to study market outcomes, such as
competition study of market power. Some notable recent empirical applications of linear-in-parameter payo¤s include
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Ryan (2012) and Collard-Wexler (2013).
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can be obtained in closed-form in the second step.2 Even in a more general nonlinear case, we argue
that our estimator is still generally easier to compute than ALSEPSD. ALSEPSD also provides a good
benchmark for a comparison with other estimators in the literature as it has a well-dened e¢ ciency
property. We establish a duality between our estimator and ALSEPSD, in the sense that they can
always be constructed to have the same asymptotic distribution. Therefore our e¢ cient estimator is
as e¢ cient as the e¢ cient ALSEPSD.
The large sample properties of our estimator (and for asymptotic least squares generally) are easy
to derive for discrete games. Technically, our estimation problem is a least squares problem with
generated regressors and regressands, which are generally smooth functions of the nite dimensional
rst stage parameters that are nonparametrically identied. In addition, the number of square terms
in the objective function does not grow with sample size but is determined by the cardinality of the
action and state spaces. Therefore our estimator belongs to the class of asymptotic least squares
estimators as dened in Gourieroux and Monfort (1985,1995) in the same sense as ALSEPSD. The
close connection between our estimator and ALSEPSD goes even further given the smooth bijective
relation between normalized expected payo¤s and choice probabilities (Hotz and Miller (1993)s
inversion); ALSEPSD is dened to minimize the distance between the probabilities implied by the
pseudo-model and the data. We show that, locally around the true, using the inverse function
theorem, our estimator can be constructed to have the same asymptotic distribution as any ALSEPSD
by choosing an appropriate weighting matrix and vice versa.
There are at least two reasons why the estimation of dynamic games can be non-trivial. First,
as well-known from the single-agent problem, it involves value functions that generally do not have
closed-form and need to be numerically evaluated so it is computationally demanding (see Rust
(1996)). For games, there is also a potential issue of indeterminacy of multiple equilibria that gives
rise to incomplete models (Tamer (2003)). A novel approach popularized by Hotz and Miller (1993)
performs inference on the pseudo-model, generated from to the observed data, by estimating the
(policy) value functions that can signicantly simplify the computational aspect. Pseudo-models are
also generally easier to handle in a strategic environment as they have been shown to be complete
for several classes of games (Srisuma (2013b)). Methodologies based on pseudo-models are often
referred to as two-step estimators since they require estimation of value functions in the rst stage.
Many recently proposed estimators for dynamic games are two-step estimators.
However, despite the simplication of two-step methods, the numerical aspects for implementing
existing estimators in the literature appear to remain a concern as they generally involve solving
highly nonlinear optimization problems. It is not uncommon to see methodology papers using esti-
2Modeling of additive linear components in the payo¤s often appear in games with entry/exit decisions, as xed
cost or scrap value, or more generally as xed e¤ects.
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mation time, amongst other things, as a competing factor. Furthermore, it is also not unusual that
the choice of playersper-period payo¤ specication is chosen with the ease of numerical implemen-
tation in mind. In particular there can be substantial benets (in terms of computational time) in
specifying players payo¤ functions to be linear-in-parameters. As the action-specic expected payo¤s
can then be written as a linear transformation of the parameter, following from the linear structure
that denes the expected payo¤s using stationary Markovian beliefs; examples of such discussions
can be found in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007, Section 3.3.1) and Pakes, Ostrovsky, Berry (2007,
Section 3). As a result, a linear parameterization of the payo¤s is a leading specication employed
in empirical work (see Footnote 1 for examples).
The objective functions that are used to dene many two-step estimators in the literature are
constructed in terms of choice probabilities implied by the pseudo-model. These probabilities can
be motivated by the equilibrium condition of the game, which can be stated in terms of consis-
tent beliefs with probabilities of best responses. Choice probabilities are used to dene traditional
criterion functions such as pseudo-likelihood function (Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Kasahara
and Shimotsu (2012)) or moment and minimum distance based conditions (Pakes, Ostrovsky, Berry
(2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)). However, in order to calculate the probabilities
implied by the pseudo-model, one must rst compute the expected discounted payo¤s that determine
the region of integration to be integrated to compute the probabilities. Furthermore, the integral
is generally a nonlinear map of the expected payo¤s, and it typically has to be computed numeri-
cally outside the well-known conditional logit framework. The integral, following Hotz and Miller
(1993)s inversion result, in fact represents a one-to-one mapping between the probabilities and the
normalized expected payo¤s.
There are also other methodologies that use expected payo¤s explicitly to dene their objective
functions. The rst such two-step estimator has been developed by Hotz, Miller, Sanders and Smith
(1994), who estimate the expected payo¤s by forward simulation, to estimate a dynamic decision
problem for a single agent. Hotz et al. dene their estimator using conditional moment restrictions.
They also recognize it is possible to have a closed-form estimator when payo¤ functions have linear-
in-parameter specication in the form of an IV estimator (see equation (5.8) in the Monte Carlo
Study section of Hotz et al. (1994)). In the context of dynamic games we are only aware of two other
current methodologies that base their objective functions explicitly on expected payo¤s. First is the
two-step estimator proposed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), who also use forward simulation
like Hotz et al. However, generally no closed-form estimator is possible with Bajari, Benkard and
Levins methodology as they compare expected payo¤s in the pseudo-model and those generated by
local perturbations. The other is Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong and Nekipelov (2009), who provide
nonparametric identication results for a more general game with continuous state space and propose
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an e¢ cient one-step estimator.3,4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with an illustrative example
that motivates our estimator, and then describes the model and our estimator for games. Section 3
gives the main results. Section 4 presents results from Monte Carlo experiments that compare the
statistical performance and relative speed of our estimator and ALSEPSD. Section 5 concludes and
provides a brief discussion on how our estimators can be adapted or applied to complement other
recent results in the literature. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Methodology
We begin with an illustration that highlights the idea behind computational advantages of our esti-
mation approach. Section 2.2 describes elements of the game. We dene the pseudo-model in Section
2.3 and introduce our estimator in Section 2.4.
2.1 Least Squares in Probabilities vs Payo¤s
Consider a model generated by the following binary choice variable:
at () = 1 [v (xt)  "t] for  2   Rp;
where xt and "t are independent. Let the cdf of "t be denoted by Q. For all x, let P (x) =
Pr [at () = 1jxt = x], so that P (x) = Q (v (x)). Assume the support of xt is nite, say fxjgJj=1
for some J < 1, so that we can dene P =   (v), where P = (P (x1) ; : : : ; P
 
xJ

)>, v =
(v (x
1) ; : : : ; v
 
xJ

)> and   (v) = (Q (v (x1)) ; : : : ; Q
 
v
 
xJ

)>.
Suppose: we observe a random sample of fat; xtg where at = at (0) for some 0 2 , which is the
parameter value of interest; v is nonparametrically identied up to , and there exists a consistent
estimator of v, say bv, for all ; and, Q is known and invertible. Let P = (P (x1) ; : : : ; P  xJ)> be
a vector of choice probabilities identied from the data, so that P = P0 , then one may consider a
class of estimators dened by
bp (V) = arg min
2
eP  bP> V eP  bP ; (1)
where eP and bP are estimators for P and P respectively, and V be some positive denite matrix.
Note that eP and bP0 are generally di¤erent since the former is model-free while the latter is estimated
3An earlier version of Bajari et al. (2009), Bajari and Hong (2006), proposes a two-step estimator that can be seen
as the dynamic game version of Hotz et al. (1994).
4Another notable estimator that does not take a two-step approach is Egesdal, Lai and Su (2012). However, Egesdal
et al. construct their objective functions in terms of choice probabilities.
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through bv. Similarly, we can dene v = (Q 1(P (x1)); : : : ; Q 1(P  xJ))>, which is also identied
from the data, so that v = v0 by construction. Then one can also consider an alternative class of
estimators: bv (W) = arg min
2
(ev   bv)>W (ev   bv) ; (2)
where ev is   1(eP) and W is a positive denite matrix. As described previously, ev and bv0 will also
generally di¤er.
Equations (1) and (2) provide two di¤erent estimators for 0. We argue the latter should generally
be easier to compute than the former since it is more convenient to compute (ev; bv) relative (eP; bP)
across di¤erent values of . This argument is most transparent when v has a linear-in-parameter
specication, i.e. v (xt) = 
>v (xt) for some p dimensional vector v (xt). Then bv can be written
as bX, where bX is a J by p matrix such that its j th row equals bv (xj)>. The solution to (2) is
unique and has a closed-form,
bX>W bX 1 bX>Wbv, when bX>W bX is invertible. Even without the
linear parameterization of v, every evaluation of bP requires the mapping of v (xj) by Q for all j,
for every , where Q is generally a nonlinear function that may have to be computed numerically.
In contrast, for (2), the potentially costly step of applying Q 1 has to be performed only once to
estimate v that does not depend on . Regardless of the parameterization in v, under some suitable
regularity conditions, and appropriate choices of weighting matrices, the two estimators can be shown
to be asymptotically equivalent near 0 in the sense that there exists WV and VW such that for any
V and W:
p
N
bv (WV)  0 = pN bp (V)  0+ op (1) ;
p
N
bp (VW)  0 = pN bv (W)  0+ op (1) ;
where N denotes the sample size.
The estimator in (1) is closely related to ALSEPSD and other Hotz and Miller (1993)s type
estimators that have been widely adopted in the dynamic game setting. In contrast the estimator
based on (2) is the asymptotic least squares analog to the estimator proposed in Hotz et al. (1994).
For the remainder of this section we develop an estimator based on (2) in the context of a dynamic
game.
2.2 Framework
We consider a game with I players, indexed by i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ig, over an innite time horizon. The
elements of the game in each period are as follows:
Actions. For notational simplicity we assume all players have the same action space. The
action set of each player is A = f0; 1; : : : ; K + 1g. We denote the action variable for player i by
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ait. Let at = (a1t; : : : ; aIt) 2 A = Ii=1A. We will also occasionally abuse the notation and write
at = (ait; a it) where a it = (a1t; : : : ; ai 1t; ai+1t : : : ; aIt) 2 AnA.
States. Player is information set is represented by the state variables sit 2 S, where sit =
(xit; "it) such that xit 2 X is common knowledge to all players and "it 2 E = RK+1 denotes private
information only observed by player i. Note that common state space X is without any loss of
generality. We shall use sit and (xt; "it) interchangeably. We dene (st; s it; "t; " it; E) analogously
to (at; a it; A), and denote the support of st by S = X  E .
State Transition. Future states are uncertain. Playersactions and states today a¤ect future
states. The evolution of the states is summarize by a Markov transition law P (st+1jst; at).
Per Period Payoff Functions. Each player has a payo¤ function, ui : A S ! R, which is
time separable. The payo¤ function for player i can depend generally on (at; xt; "it) but not directly
on " it.
Discounting Factor. Future periods payo¤s are discounted at the rate i 2 (0; 1) for each
player. For notational simplicity we take i =  for all i.
We impose the following assumptions throughout the paper.
Assumption M1 (Additive Separability). ui;i (ai; a i; x; "i) = i;i (ai; a i; x)+
P
a02A "i (a
0) 1 [ai = a0]
for all i; i; ai; a i; x; "i, where i;i is known up to i 2 i  Rpi.
Assumption M2 (Conditional independence). The transitional distribution of the states has the
following factorization: P (xt+1; "t+1jxt; "t; at) = Q ("t+1)G (xt+1jxt; at), where Q is the cumulative
distribution function of "t and G denotes the transition law of xt+1 conditioning on at and xt.
Assumption M3 (Independent private values). The private information is independently dis-
tributed across players, and each is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure whose
density is bounded on RK+1. So that Q (") =
QI
i=1Qi ("i), where Qi denotes the cumulative distrib-
ution function of "it.
Assumption M4 (Discrete public values). The support of xt is nite so that X =

x1; : : : ; xJ
	
for some J <1.
M1 - M4 are standard in the modeling of dynamic discrete games in the literature. Note that M2
implies xt and "t are independent, however, this can be relaxed slightly at the cost of more notation
by changing all of our statements regarding Q and Qi to be taken conditional on xt. M4 is also
7
not essential for the general idea behind estimation of dynamic games. Although the complexity of
the asymptotic theory and the practical aspects increase signicantly when xt includes continuous
random variables; see Bajari et al. (2009) and Srisuma and Linton (2012).
At time t every player observes sit, each then chooses ait simultaneously. We consider a Markovian
framework where playersbehaviors are stationary across time and players are assumed to play pure
strategies. More specically, for some i : S ! A, ait = i (sit) for all i; t, so that whenever
sit = si then i (sit) = i (si ) for any  . The beliefs are also time invariant. Player i0s beliefs, i, is
a distribution of at = (1 (s1t) ; : : : ; I (sIt)) conditional on xt for some pure Markov strategy prole
(1; : : : ; I). The decision problem for each player is to solve
max
ai2Ai
fEi [ui;i (ait; a it; si) jsit = si; ait = ai] + Ei [Wi;i (sit+1;i) jsit = si; ait = ai]g; (3)
where Wi;i (si;i) =
1X
=t
 tEi [ui;i (a ; si ) jsit = si] ;
for any si. The subscript i on the expectation operator makes explicit that present and future
actions are integrated out with respect to the beliefs i; in particular, player i forms an expectation
for all playersfuture actions including herself, and todays actions of opposing players. Wi;i (;i) is
a policy value function since the expected discounted return needs not be an optimal value from an
optimization problem since i can be any beliefs, not necessarily equilibrium beliefs. Note that the
transition laws for future states are completely determined by the primitives and the beliefs. Any
strategy prole that solves the decision problems for all i and is consistent with the beliefs satises
is an equilibrium strategy. It is well-known that playersbest responses are pure strategies almost
surely and Markov perfect equilibria for games under M1 - M4 (e.g. see Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)). However, there may be multiple equilibria.
2.3 Pseudo-Model
We now dene the pseudo-model that plays a central role in two-step estimation methods. The start-
ing point is the structural assumption that we observe random sample of f1 (s1t) ; : : : ; I (sIt) ; xt; xt+1g
from a single equilibrium, where i = i;i0 for some i0 2 i  Rpi for all i. Let P i (aijx) =
Pr [i (sit) = aijxt = x] for all ai; x. Then we have: (i) the equilibrium beliefs for all players is sum-
marized by
QI
i=1 P

i ; (ii) Pr [ait = aijxt = x] = P i (aijx) and Pr [xt+1 = x0jxt = x; at = a] = G (x0jx; a)
for all a; x; x0. For notational simplicity, for this section and the next, we shall: omit ; let i and
Pi denote the equilibrium strategy and choice probability function for player i; and, without any
ambiguity let ait = i (sit) for all i; t. Then the pseudo-model can be dened as a collection of joint
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conditional distributions indexed by  = (>1 ; : : : ; 
>
I )
> 2 Ii=1i =   Rp. Also let 0 denote
(>10; : : : ; 
>
I0)
>.
Definition: The pseudo-model is fPg2 such that P =
QI
i=1 Pi;i and for all i; i; ai; x:
Pi;i (ajx) = Pr [i;i (sit) = ajxt = x] a.s.; where
i;i (sit) = arg max
ai2A
fE [i;i (ai; a it; xt)jxt] + "it (ai) + E [Vi;i (st+1)jxt; ait = ai]g ;
Vi;i (sit) = E[i;i (ait; a it; xt) +
KX
a0=0
"it (a
0) 1 [ait = a0] jsit] + E [Vi;i (sit+1)j sit] :
By construction Pi;i = Pi for all i when i = i0 for all i, and Vi;i also equals Wi;i (;i) (as de-
ned in (3)), when i =
QI
j=1 Pj. Let vi;i (ai; x) = E [i;i (ai; a it; xt)jxt = x]+E [Vi;i (st+1)jxt = x; ait = ai],
then we can write
Pi;i (ajx) = Pr [vi;i (ai; xt) + "it (ai) > vi;i (a0i; xt) + "it (a0i) for all a0i 6= aijxt = x] ; (4)
which is familiar from the classical random utility model (e.g. see McFadden (1974)) with mean
utility vi;i . The numerical advantage in working with the pseudo-model, as opposed to the actual
model, is that vi;i is relatively straightforward to compute for di¤erent i, since all expectations that
dene vi;i are calculated independent of i; all with respect to P (st+1jst; at) for all players that is
equivalent to earlier notation using Ei when i =
QI
j=1 Pj for all i.
We shall heavily exploit the fact that vi;i is a linear transformation of i;i . To see this, rst look
at the choice-specic expected return:
E [Vi;i (st+1)jxt; ait = ai] = E [E [Vi;i (st+1)jxt+1]jxt; ait = ai] ; and
E [Vi;i (st)jxt] = E[i;i (ait; a it; xt) +
KX
a0=0
"it (a
0) 1 [ait = a0] jxt] + E [E [Vi (st+1) jxt+1] jxt] :
Let mi;i = E[Vi;i (sit) jxt = ] and gi;i = E[Vi;i (sit+1) jxt = ; ait = ]. Then, using a linear
functional notation, we have
gi;i = Himi;i ;
mi;i = ri;i + ri + Lmi;i ; where for all a; x
ri;i (x) = E [i;i (ait; a it; xt)jxt = x] ;
ri (x) = E[
KX
a0=0
"it (a
0) 1 [ait = a0] jxt = x];
Lm (x) = E [m (xt+1) jxt = x] ;
Him (a; x) = E [m (xt+1) jxt = x; ait = a] ;
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where L and Hi are linear maps and ri;i is a linear transformation of i;i . Since (I   L) 1 is also
generally a well-dened linear map, as L is a contraction as its norm is strictly less than 1, then
vi;i =
 Ri + Hi (I   L) 1R i;i + vi;
where Ri and R are conditional expectation operators, conditioning on xt, integrating over a it and
at respectively , and vi = Hi (I   L) 1 ri.
The choice probabilities can also be written in terms of di¤erences in choice specic expected
payo¤s. Let vi;i (ai; x) denote vi;i (ai; x)  vi;i (0; x) for ai > 0, then (4) becomes
Pi;i (ajx) = Pr [vi;i (ai; xt) + "it (ai) > vi;i (a0i; xt) + "it (a0i) for all a0i > 0jxt = x] : (5)
Since A and X are nite, the relationship between fvi;i (ai; x)gai>0;x2X and fi;i (a; x)ga2A;x2X
can be represented through a matrix equation. We state this representation as a lemma.
Lemma R: Under M1 - M4 fvi;i (ai; x)gai>0;x2X can then be represented by a JK vector,
vi;i :
vi;i = D (Ri + HiMR)i;i + vi; (6)
where i;i is a J (K + 1)
I  vector of fi;i (a; x)ga2A;x2X so that elements in: Rii;i are
fE [i;i (ai; a it; xt)jxt = x]gai2A;x2X ; Ri;i are fE [i;i (ait; a it; xt)jxt = x]gx2X ; M involve
fPr [xt+1 = x0jxt = x]g; Hi are Pr [xt+1 = x0jxt = x; ait = ai]; and, D is a di¤erence matrix with re-
spect to the expected payo¤s from playing action 0; and, vi is the di¤erenced vector form of
the transformation of ri by iHi (I   L) 1 normalized by action 0. The detailed constructions of
vi;D;Ri;R;Hi and M are provided in the Appendix.
In what follows, we let vi denote vi;i0 . And, similarly, it shall be convenient to vector-
ize the probabilities. In particular, we let Pi;i and Pi denote the JK vector that represent
fPi;i (aijx)gai>0;x2X and fPi (aijx)gai>0;x2X respectively.
2.4 Estimation
Many objective functions proposed in the literature often can be written directly in terms of the
probabilities from the pseudo-model, such as pseudo-likelihood and GMM, based on the construction
that Pi;i coincides with Pi when i = i0. However, from a numerical perspective, computing the
pseudo-probabilities requires a costly additional step of computation, namely the integration with
respect to the distribution of "it that maps vi;i into Pi;i (see (5)). These integrals generally do not
have closed-form in the expected payo¤s outside the well-known exception when private values are
i.i.d. extreme value. Even if the integrals have closed-form, the integration is generally a nonlinear
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mapping of vi;i into Pi;i . In order to preserve the linear structure outlined previously, we propose
to construct objective functions based directly on vi;i .
The validity of such objective functions, to identify 0, follows from the bijective relation between
vi;i and Pi;i for each i. This well-known result follows from Proposition 1 of Hotz and Miller
(1993), which we shall refer to as Hotz and Millers inversion in this paper (also see Lemma 8 of
Matzkin (1991), Lemma 1 of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), and, for a recent generalization
of these results, Norets and Takahashi (2013)).5 In particular, it immediately follows that for any
i, Pi;i coincides with Pi if and only if vi;i coincides with vi, where vi is identiable from the
data by Hotz and Millers inversion. Then we can construct a class of estimators based on minimizing
the distance between fvi;igIi=1 and fvigIi=1.
Using Lemma R, we can write vi;i = Xi (i) + vi, where
Xi (i) = D (Ri + HiMR)i;i : (7)
Note that i enters Xi (i) through a matrix transform of the vector i;i , where the former does
not depend on i and the latter is completely known and specied by the researcher. By Hotz and
Millers inversion, we also have vi = i (Pi) for some nonlinear, but known, function i that only
depends on the distributional assumption of "it. Then we can dene a JK vector, Yi, where
Yi = i (Pi) vi: (8)
Note that Yi is dened independently of i. So that, by construction:
Yi = Xi (i) when i = i0:
Let Y =  Y>1 ; : : : ;Y>I >,  =  >1 ; : : : ; >I > and dene a block diagonal matrix X () = diag(X1 (1) ;
: : : ;XI (I)). In the next section we analyze the asymptotic properties for a class of estimators that
are motivated from minimizing
S (;W) = (Y   X ())>W(Y   X ()); (9)
over , for some weighting matrix W.
It is also worth emphasizing that, through fvigIi=1 ; fRigIi=1 ;R;L and fHigIi=1, for any : X ()
and Y are explicit functions, say TX (; 0) and TY (0) respectively, of a nite-dimensional vector, 0,
that consists of choice and transition probabilities. However, optimization with S (;W) is infeasible
since X () and Y are not observed, as 0 is unknown. Given a sample from a single equilibrium,
5Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) also show equilibrium condition can be characterized in terms of expected
payo¤s; see details of their Lemma 1 for further discussions.
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f1 (s1t) ; : : : ; I (sIt) ; xt; xt+1g, 0 can be identied from the data under weak conditions, hence X ()
and Y can also be estimated directly from the data for all . Consequently we consider a feasible
estimation criterion where X and Y are replaced by bX () = TX (; b) and bY = TY (b) respectively,
for some preliminary estimator, b, of 0. We denote the sample counterpart of S by bS, so that
bS(; cW) = ( bY   bX ())>cW( bY   bX ()); (10)
where cW can be random and depend on the sample size. We dene our estimator, b(cW), to be the
minimizer of bS ; cW: b(cW) = arg min
2
bS(; cW):
Therefore b(cW) is generally a nonlinear least square estimator with generated regressors and regres-
sands. Note that bS(; cW) is easy to evaluate for di¤erent values of , following (7) and (8), bXi ()
can be computed by a matrix multiplication of i;i by the estimator of D (Ri + HiMR), which
does not depend on i, and bYi is also independent of i.
3 Main Results
We give large sample properties of our estimator in full generality in Section 3.1. We consider special
cases when payo¤s have linear-in-parameter and partially linear specications in Section 3.2 and 3.3
respectively. We discuss the relationship between our estimator and ALSEPSD in Section 3.4. In
what follows we denote the matrix norm by kk, so that kBk = ptrace (B>B) for any real matrix
B, and we let 
p!and  d!denote convergence in probability and distribution respectively.
3.1 General Case
From the previous section, we see that TX (; ) and TY () are deterministic and smooth functions
in  for any . To analyze the asymptotic properties of b(cW), it will be useful to keep separate the
sampling distribution of the preliminary estimator and the corresponding generated regressors and
regressands. We begin with a preliminary requirement for b.
Assumption P: (i) b p! 0; and, (ii) pN (b   0) d! N (0;).
There are several choices for b in practice that satisfy P under very weak conditions. The simplest
options are perhaps the empirical choice and transition probabilities, otherwise kernel estimators can
be employed (Li and Racine (2006)). We now present our regularity conditions and main results in
terms of (X () ;Y) and their estimators ( bX () ; bY).
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Assumption A1: 0 2 int () where  is a compact subset of Rp, and X () = X (0) if and
only if  = 0.
Assumption A2: cW p!W, where W is a non-stochastic positive denite matrix.
Assumption A3: sup2 kX ()k and kYk are nite, and sup2
 bX () X () p! 0 andbY p! Y.
Assumption A4: X () is continuously di¤erentiable at 0 and rX = @X ()@>

=0
has full column
rank.
Assumption A5: sup2B(0)
@ bX ()
@>  
@X ()
@>
 p! 0, where B (0) denotes some neighborhood of
0.
Dene bU = bY   bX (0).
Assumption A6:
p
N bU d! N (0;) for some non-stochastic positive denite matrix .
Comments on Assumptions A1 - A3.
These conditions are su¢ cient for the consistency of our estimator. A1 - A2 constitute to a
high level identication condition as it ensures (9) has a unique solution at 0. There has been
little work on more primitive conditions for parametric identication of payo¤ functions in dynamic
games. Most identication results in the literature are nonparametric that build on the work of
Magnac and Thesmar (2002); see Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Bajari et al. (2009).
However, using Hotz and Millers inversion, it follows that the condition for identication of the
pseudo-model at 0, in the sense that Pi;i = Pi;i0 for all i if and only if i = i0 for all i, is
precisely the identication condition required in A1. Furthermore, by inspecting Lemma R more
closely, for each i, we see that the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the unique parameterization
of Xi (i) at i0 is for the intersection between the fi;i   i;i0 : i 2 in fi0gg and the null
space of D (Ri + HiMR) to be empty. Although, without any restriction on i;i , A1 generally
does not hold since D (Ri + HiMR) is always rank-decient. For a closely related discussion see
Srisuma (2013a), who provides constructive conditions for parametric identication results in a single
agent model that can be generalized directly to the games considered in this paper. Also see the
identication condition and comments of B1 in Section 3.2 when linear-in-parameter restriction is
imposed. The uniform boundedness and consistency conditions essentially depend on fi;igIi=1. In
particular, if D (Ri + HiMR) is nite then continuity of fi;igIi=1 ensures sup2 kX ()k is nite
since  is compact. Then uniform consistency also follows if there exists a consistent estimator for
D (Ri + HiMR), which is implied by P(i).
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Comments on Assumptions A4 - A6.
For the distribution theory, additional local conditions around 0 are required. A4 - A5 are
standard smoothness and regularity conditions for an asymptotic normality of an extremum estimator
that optimizes a smooth objective function. Similar to the discussion of su¢ cient conditions for A3,
using Lemma R, a su¢ cient condition for continuous di¤erentiability of X () in A4 is continuous
di¤erentiability of i;i at i0 for all i, then A5 will also follow if P(i) holds. Furthermore, if P(ii)
holds, so that the elements in bX (0) and bY have asymptotically normal distribution, then by applying
a delta-method A6 also holds with  = rr> , where r = @@> (TY ()  TX (0; )) j=0 .
Our estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal under these assumptions.
Theorem 1 (Consistency): Under assumptions A1 - A3, b(cW) p! 0.
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic Normality): Under assumptions A1 - A6,
p
N
b(cW)  0 d! N (0;
W) ;
where 
W =
 r>XWrX  1r>XWWrX  r>XWrX  1.
In large sample, the estimators that uniquely solve (10) are distinguishable up to the rst order
by 
W . The e¢ cient estimator in this class can be found by choosing the optimal weighting matrix,
W, that minimizes 
W over the set of all possible positive denite matrices (i.e. e¢ ciency gain in
the spirit of Chamberlain (1982) and Hansen (1982) for instance).
Theorem 3 (Efficiency): Under assumptions A1 - A6, (i) the asymptotic variance of
p
N
b(cW)  0
is bounded below by 
 1 =
 r>X 1rX  1; and, (ii) if cW p!  1 then pN b(cW)  0 d!
N (0;
 1).
The rst part of Theorem 3 says that the lower variance bound for the class of estimators we
consider is
 r>X 1rX  1. The second part states that any consistent estimator of  1 is su¢ cient
to produce an e¢ cient estimator. In practice, consistent estimator for  1 will typically require a
preliminary consistent estimator for 0. The simplest choice is to chooseW to be an identity matrix,
Id. In this case the estimator for i0 can be computed individually for each player. We state this in
the following corollary.
Corollary A (Identity Weighted Estimator): Under assumptions A1, A3 - A6,p
N
b(Id)  0 d! N (0;
Id), where b(Id) = b1(Id)>; : : : ;bI(Id)>>. Furthermore, for all i:bi(Id) = arg mini2i( bYi   bXi (i))>( bYi   bXi (i)) such that pN bi(Id)  i0 d! N (0;  r>XirXi 1
r>XiirXi
 r>XirXi 1) with rXi = @Xi()@>i i=i0 and i = limN!1 V ar(pN( bYi   bXi (i0)).
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3.2 Linear-in-Parameter Specication
We now consider the leading special case when payo¤ functions have a linear-in-parameter specica-
tion.
Assumption M5 (Linear-in-parameter payo¤s). For all (i; i; ai; a i; x),
i;i (ai; a i; x) = 
>
i i (ai; a i; x) ;
for some p dimensional vector i (ai; a i; x) = (1i (ai; a i; x) ; : : : ; pi (ai; a i; x))>.
We assume M1 - M5 hold throughout this subsection. Then, with a slight abuse of notation,
Xi (i) in (7) simplies to Xii, where
Xi = D (Ri + HiMR) i; (11)
and i is a J (K + 1)
I by p matrix of fi (ai; a i; x)gai2A;x2X . Let X = diag (X1; : : : ;XI). The
limiting and sample objective functions dened in (9) and (10) respectively become
S lip (;W) = (Y   X )>W(Y   X ); andbS lip(; cW) = ( bY   bX )>cW( bY   bX ):
If bX>cW bX is non-singular, then bS lip(; cW) is globally convex. The solution to the minization problem
has a well-known closed-form expression of a weighted least squares estimator, namely
blip(cW) =  bX>cW bX 1 bX>cW bY : (12)
Although the large sample properties for blip(cW) follow immediately from Section 3.1, they can be
specialized substantially to incorporate M5. Since the results in this subsection may be most relevant
for empirical applications we provide some details here.
Assumption B1: X has full column rank.
Assumption B2: cW p!W, where W is a non-stochastic positive denite matrix.
Assumption B3: kXk and kYk are nite, and bX p! X and bY p! Y.
Dene bU lip = bY   bX 0.
Assumption B4:
p
N bU lip d! N  0;lip for some non-stochastic positive denite matrix lip.
Comments on Assumptions B1 - B4.
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Similar to A1 - A2, B1 and B2 ensure S lip(;W) has a unique solution at 0. In this case, the full
rank condition of X is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the identication of the pseudo-model
(for more details see Srisuma (2013)). The sample counterpart of B1, namely the rank condition ofbX , also has a nite sample signicance. If cW is positive denite, then the full column rank condition
of bX is necessary and su¢ cient for bS lip(; cW) to have a unique solution, which equals to blip(cW) as
dened in (12). Assumptions B3 and B4 are immediate specializations of A3 - A6.
We state the large sample properties for blip(cW) as corollaries without proofs.
Corollary 1 (Consistency): Under assumptions B1 - B3, blip(cW) p! 0.
Corollary 2 (Asymptotic Normality): Under assumptions B1 - B4,
p
N
blip(cW)  0 d! N 0;
lipW ;
where 
lipW =
 X>WX  1X>WlipWX  X>WX  1.
Corollary 3 (Efficiency): Under assumptions B1 -B4, (i) the asymptotic variance of
p
N
blip(cW)  0
is bounded below by 
lip
lip 1
=

X>lip 1X
 1
; and, (ii) if cW p! lip 1 then pN blip(cW)  0 d!
N

0;
lip
lip 1

.
Similarly to the general case, consistent estimator for lip
 1
requires a preliminary consistent
estimator for 0. We have the counterpart to Corollary A when we choose W to be an identity
matrix I.
Corollary B (Identity Weighted Estimator): Under assumptions B1, B3 and B4,p
N
blip(I)  0 d! N 0;
lipI , where blip(I) =  bX> bX 1 bX> bY and 
lipI =  X>X  1X>X  X>X  1 :
Furthermore, for all i: blip(I) = blip1 (I)>; : : : ;blipI (I)>> such that blipi (I) =  bX>i bXi 1 bX>i bYi andp
N
blipi (I)  i0 d! N (0;  X>i Xi 1X>i lipi Xi  X>i Xi 1) with lipi = limN!1 V ar(pN( bYi  bXii0).
We have shown here that once we have ( bY ; bX ), under some regularity conditions, a consistent
estimator for 0 can be obtained by an OLS estimator, blip (I) =  bX> bX 1 bX> bY (Corollary B),
which can be used to construct an e¢ cient estimator using a familiar a feasible GLS formulation,blip blip 1 =  bX>blip 1 bX 1 bX>blip 1 bY where blip 1 is a consistent estimator of lip 1 .
Our closed-form estimators also readily accommodate linear restrictions. For instance, sometimes
there are a priori restrictions one may wish to impose on 0 such as symmetry. More formally, suppose
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0 is known to satisfy D>0 =  for some known p by q matrix D that has full row rank q < p and
some q dimensional vector . Then a restricted estimator elip(cW) that minimizes (10) subject to
D>elip(cW) = , has the following closed-form expression
elip(cW) = blip(cW)   bX>cW bX 1DD>  bX>cW bX 1D 1 D>blip(cW)   ;
where blip(cW) is the unrestricted estimator dened in (12). The expression above can be derived
using Lagrangean method or through matrix manipulations (see Amemiya (1985, Section 1.4)). And,
since elip(cW) is an a¢ ne transformation of blip(cW), it is easy to verify that the optimal weighting
matrices for elip(cW) are the same as those described in Corollary 3, i.e. any cW p! lip 1 .
3.3 Partially Linear Specication
One may argue that, in some situations, Assumption M5 is at odds with the spirit of structural
estimation if the functions in the vector i are interpreted as basis functions. We relax the linear-in-
parameter requirement and instead consider a partially linear structure that may arise naturally by
ways of additive xed e¤ects, or, frequently in modeling of entry/exit games, as xed costs or scrap
value. Now suppose i =
 
A>i ; 
B>
i
>
for all i.
Assumption M6 (Partially linear payo¤s). For all (i; i; ai; a i; x),
i;i (ai; a i; x) = 
A>
i 
A
i (ai; a i; x) + 
B
i;Bi
(ai; a i; x) ;
for some p dimensional vector Ai (ai; a i; x) =

A1i (ai; a i; x) ; : : : ; 
Ap
i (ai; a i; x)
>
.
We assume M1 - M4 and M6 hold throughout this subsection. Then it is easy to see that the
RHS of equation (6) in Lemma R becomes
D (Ri + HiMR)
A
i;i
+ D (Ri + HiMR)
B
i;Bi
+ vi;
and, we dene, analogously to (7) and (11), XAi = D (Ri + HiMR) Ai , andXBi
 
Bi

= D (Ri + HiMR)
B
i;Bi
.
Once again, stacking up the vectors from all players, the limiting and sample objective functions de-
ned in (9) and (10) respectively become
Spl (;W) = (Y   XAA  XB  B)>W(Y   XAA  XB  B); andbSpl(; cW) = ( bY   bXAA   bXB  B)>cW( bY   bXAA   bXB  B);
where the terms in the above display should by now be familiar. In order to avoid repetition we only
provide a brief discussion of how  can be (e¢ ciently) estimated.
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The structural identifying condition in this setting is:
Y = XAA + XB  B if and only if  A; B =  A0 ; B0  :
The additively linear structure allows us to use a Frisch-Waugh-Lovell type argument to estimate A0
and B0 sequentially in two stages. In particular, 
A
0 and 
B
0 satisfy the following identities:
MWAY =MWAXB
 
B0

; (13)
whereMWA = I XA
 XA>WXA 1XA>W is an oblique projection matrix (e.g. see Davidson and
MacKinnon (1993)), so thatMWAXA is a matrix of zeros, and
Y   XB  B0  = XAA0 : (14)
An asymptotic least squares estimator that minimizes bSpl(; cW) can then be constructed sequentially
in two stages. Let
bSpl1 (B; cW) = (McWA bY  McWA bX  B)>cW(McWA bY  McWA bX  B);
whereMcWA = I  bXA( bXA>cW bXA) 1 bXA>cW. In the rst stage we obtain bplB(cW) = arg minB bSpl1 (B; cW).
For the second stage, let
bSpl2 (A; cW) = ( bY   bXB(bB)  bXAA)>cW( bY   bXB(bB)  bXAA):
Then bplA(cW) = arg minA bSpl2 (A; cW) = ( bXA>cW bXA) 1 bXA>cW( bY   bXB(bB)). It is easy to verify the
rst order conditions that bplA(cW) and bplB(cW) individually solve are identical to the ones obtained
from jointly minimizing bSpl(; cW).
The practical advantage of the sequential approach is purely numerical, in the same spirit as
the well-known partition regression methods described since the work of Frisch and Waugh (1933).
Specically, we only need to perform nonlinear optimization routine to search over a reduced pa-
rameter space for bplB(cW) in the rst stage, as bplA(cW) has a closed-form expression in terms ofbplB(cW). Note also that the optimal weighting matrix for bSpl1 and bSpl2 is the same, and is identical
to the one described in Theorem 3.
3.4 An Equivalent ALSE
Generally it is not possible to directly compare asymptotic e¢ ciency of di¤erent estimators in the
literature, although they estimate the same model, since many of the estimators are dened using
non-nesting objective functions. An exception can be found in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler
(2008), who show ALSEPSD includes some estimators of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes,
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Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) as special cases. Similar to our general estimator dened in Section 2,
the class of ALSEPSD is also indexed by a positive denite matrix and optimal weights can be found
to dene an e¢ cient estimator (cf. Theorem 3). As implied by the Proposition E below, our e¢ cient
estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the e¢ cient ALSEPSD. In fact, more is true, the class of
estimators we consider and that of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler are asymptotically equivalent
in the sense that one can choose appropriate weighting matrices so that the two estimators always
have the same asymptotic distribution.
Proposition E. ALSEPSD and our estimator are asymptotically equivalent.
The equivalence follows from the existence of a smooth bijective relation between the choice
probabilities and the normalized expected payo¤s, i.e. essentially by Hotz and Millers inversion and
an application of the inverse function theorem. The precise relationship between the two estimators
are summarized by the equations in display (17) that can be found in the Appendix.
We end this section with a remark on the relationship between asymptotic least squares esti-
mators and GMM estimators. ALSEPSD and our estimator are dened using objective functions
that look at the di¤erences between the data and pseudo-model implied probabilities and payo¤s
respectively at every possible actions and observed states. These di¤erences can also be written
as moment conditions, thus asymptotic least squares estimators can also equivalently be dened as
GMM estimators (see Chamberlain (1987)). As a consequence, it follows from Proposition E that the
GMM estimators of Hotz and Miller (1993) and Hotz et al. (1994) are also asymptotically equivalent
for a stationary single agent decision model (a special case of our game when I = 1).6
4 Monte Carlo Experiments
We illustrate the performance of our closed-form estimator using the Monte Carlo design in Sec-
tion 7 of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008); who also provide further comparison with other
estimators in the literature.
Setup
Consider a symmetric two-rm dynamic entry game. In each period t, each rm i(= 1; 2) has
two possible choices: be active or not active, ait 2 f0; 1g, where 0 corresponds to not activeand
1 to active. Publically observed state variable has four elements, and can be represented by the
6The estimator of Hotz et al. (1994) has an additional source of sampling error since they estimate the discounted
expected payo¤s, E [Vi;i (st+1)jxt; ait], by forward simulation. However, under suitable conditions, the error from
forward simulation does not a¤ect the asymptotic distribution of their estimator.
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actions made by both rms in period t   1, so that xt = (a1t 1; a2t 1). The vector of states evolves
over time according to the transition st+1 = at. Firm 10s period payo¤s are described as follows:
1; (a1t; a2t; xt) = 1 [a1t = 1]  [1 + 2a2t] + 1 [a1t = 1; a1t 1 = 0]  F + 1 [a1t = 0; a1t 1 = 1] W;
where (1; 2; F;W ) denote respectively the monopoly prot, duopoly prot, entry cost and scrap
value that rm 1 may obtain. Each rm also receives additive private shocks that are i.i.d. N (0; 1).
The game is symmetric and rms 2 payo¤s are dened analogously.
We set (10; 20; F0;W0) = (1:2; 1:2; 0:2; 0:1). Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008, p.920)
show that there are three distinct equilibria (ve if we permute the identity of the players as there is
one symmetric equilibrium). We generate the data using di¤erent equilibria of the game and provide
estimates for (10; 20; F0) for each equilibrium. W0 is taken as known, since it is not separately
identied (see Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2013)). For each sample size T = 100; 500; 1000; 5000, we
report the same statistics as Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (mean and standard deviation of the
estimator for each parameter, and the averaged mean squared error across the three parameters)
from 1000 simulations of four estimators: OLS, GLS, PSD-I and PSD-E, for each equilibrium. OLS
and GLS estimators correspond to our ine¢ cient and e¢ cient estimators that have closed-form
(see Corollary B and Corollary 3 respectively). PSD-I and PSD-E are the ine¢ cient and e¢ cient
versions of ALSEPSD respectively; the former uses identity weighting matrix. Our Tables 1 - 3
below correspond respectively to equilibria 1 - 3 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), thus
are directly comparable to their Tables 1 - 3 on p.921-922.
20
T Estimator F 10 20 MSE
100 OLS -0.244 (0:328) 1.071 (0:330) -1.087 (0:385) 0.396
GLS -0.210 (0:136) 1.227 (0:276) -1.230 (0:255) 0.161
PSD-I -0.262 (0:316) 1.083 (0:341) -1.094 (0:390) 0.395
PSD-E -0.175 (0:155) 1.292 (0:303) -1.327 (0:301) 0.231
500 OLS -0.213 (0:151) 1.169 (0:141) -1.161 (0:179) 0.077
GLS -0.197 (0:048) 1.213 (0:133) -1.209 (0:096) 0.029
PSD-I -0.220 (0:148) 1.176 (0:144) -1.167 (0:186) 0.079
PSD-E -0.188 (0:047) 1.232 (0:129) -1.223 (0:102) 0.031
1000 OLS -0.206 (0:105) 1.184 (0:090) -1.182 (0:125) 0.035
GLS -0.200 (0:030) 1.200 (0:081) -1.197 (0:062) 0.011
PSD-I -0.209 (0:102) 1.186 (0:090) -1.185 (0:130) 0.036
PSD-E -0.195 (0:029) 1.212 (0:077) -1.204 (0:064) 0.011
5000 OLS -0.204 (0:079) 1.194 (0:061) -1.190 (0:093) 0.019
GLS -0.206 (0:074) 1.196 (0:059) -1.192 (0:089) 0.017
PSD-I -0.201 (0:079) 1.199 (0:064) -1.196 (0:094) 0.019
PSD-E -0.203 (0:077) 1.198 (0:061) -1.195 (0:092) 0.018
Table 1: Monte Carlo results (Equilibrium 1). OLS and GLS are our closed-form estimators that
are ine¢ cient and e¢ cient respectively. PSD-I and PSD-E are asymptotic least squares estima-
tors of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) that are ine¢ cient (identity weighted) and e¢ cient
respectively.
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T Estimator F 10 20 MSE
100 OLS -0.317 (0:472) 0.971 (0:380) -0.891 (0:543) 0.822
GLS -0.428 (0:333) 0.998 (0:328) -0.892 (0:438) 0.598
PSD-I -0.264 (0:495) 1.065 (0:434) -1.006 (0:592) 0.843
PSD-E -0.422 (1:098) 1.073 (0:488) -0.976 (0:588) 1.903
500 OLS -0.221 (0:236) 1.147 (0:192) -1.120 (0:280) 0.181
GLS -0.262 (0:210) 1.153 (0:180) -1.116 (0:261) 0.157
PSD-I -0.201 (0:242) 1.192 (0:205) -1.171 (0:284) 0.182
PSD-E -0.232 (0:214) 1.172 (0:182) -1.154 (0:265) 0.153
1000 OLS -0.216 (0:168) 1.166 (0:135) -1.155 (0:196) 0.088
GLS -0.233 (0:144) 1.171 (0:123) -1.157 (0:180) 0.072
PSD-I -0.205 (0:171) 1.189 (0:142) -1.182 (0:201) 0.090
PSD-E -0.220 (0:150) 1.177 (0:126) -1.173 (0:187) 0.075
5000 OLS -0.205 (0:076) 1.192 (0:058) -1.189 (0:091) 0.018
GLS -0.203 (0:037) 1.196 (0:039) -1.195 (0:050) 0.005
PSD-I -0.202 (0:076) 1.197 (0:061) -1.196 (0:092) 0.018
PSD-E -0.200 (0:043) 1.197 (0:040) -1.201 (0:058) 0.007
Table 2: Monte Carlo results (Equilibrium 2). OLS and GLS are our closed-form estimators that
are ine¢ cient and e¢ cient respectively. PSD-I and PSD-E are asymptotic least squares estima-
tors of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) that are ine¢ cient (identity weighted) and e¢ cient
respectively.
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T Estimator F 10 20 MSE
100 OLS -0.304 (0:475) 0.997 (0:398) -0.895 (0:558) 0.840
GLS -0.436 (0:356) 1.015 (0:352) -0.88 (0:446) 0.641
PSD-I -0.241 (0:514) 1.102 (0:471) -1.023 (0:624) 0.917
PSD-E -0.397 (0:445) 1.081 (0:381) -0.975 (0:526) 0.722
500 OLS -0.225 (0:244) 1.149 (0:187) -1.118 (0:282) 0.184
GLS -0.26 0 (0:229) 1.159 (0:185) -1.122 (0:278) 0.175
PSD-I -0.201 (0:258) 1.200 (0:222) -1.176 (0:304) 0.208
PSD-E -0.230 (0:239) 1.177 (0:189) -1.157 (0:287) 0.178
1000 OLS -0.214 (0:177) 1.169 (0:134) -1.158 (0:204) 0.093
GLS -0.227 (0:170) 1.179 (0:136) -1.166 (0:206) 0.092
PSD-I -0.202 (0:180) 1.193 (0:147) -1.187 (0:211) 0.099
PSD-E -0.207 (0:186) 1.191 (0:148) -1.188 (0:220) 0.105
5000 OLS -0.203 (0:082) 1.194 (0:062) -1.190 (0:093) 0.019
GLS -0.205 (0:076) 1.197 (0:060) -1.192 (0:090) 0.017
PSD-I -0.201 (0:083) 1.200 (0:066) -1.196 (0:095) 0.020
PSD-E -0.201 (0:078) 1.199 (0:061) -1.197 (0:094) 0.018
Table 3: Monte Carlo results (Equilibrium 3). OLS and GLS are our closed-form estimators that
are ine¢ cient and e¢ cient respectively. PSD-I and PSD-E are asymptotic least squares estima-
tors of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) that are ine¢ cient (identity weighted) and e¢ cient
respectively.
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The results are as expected from the theory. At smaller sample sizes the estimators are genuinely
di¤erent regardless of the choice of weight matrices. Since the model is fully parametric both e¢ cient
estimators generally perform better than the ine¢ cient ones even at T = 100 across all equilibria.
With larger sample sizes the ine¢ cient and e¢ cient estimators seem to have similar properties for
both methods. Although, in theory, the ine¢ cient estimators need not be asymptotically equivalent
as both are weighed by the same identity matrix (see equation (17) in the Appendix).
We now abstract away from the statistical properties and consider the numerical aspects. To
illustrate the potential for computational advantages of our estimator, we introduce an additive
market xed e¤ect to the per period payo¤ in the game described above. We use the number of
markets, denoted by M, to control the complexity of the game.7 For each M, we solve the model once
and simulated ve times using the symmetric equilibrium. We report in Table 4, the average central
processing unit (CPU) times in seconds to compute our estimators and ALSEPSD that minimize
their respective limiting objective functions (no sampling error, using true choice and transition
probabilities); standard errors are in parentheses.8
M 1 10 20 30 100 200
OLS 0.0021 0.0125 0.0245 0.0366 0.1241 0.2654
(0:0010) (0:0000) (0:0000) (0:0001) (0:0004) (0:0004)
GLS 0.0180 0.1542 0.3091 0.4658 1.8504 5.6084
(0:0038) (0:0001) (0:0013) (0:0002) (0:0023) (0:0069)
PSD-I 0.2084 4.9957 28.6415 73.3173 1171.5137 5657.6393
(0:0089) (0:0351) (0:1805) (0:0846) (1:9478) (0:9183)
PSD-E 0.3564 10.4140 52.0471 109.5519 1607.2349 7621.5963
(0:0079) (0:0359) (0:1824) (0:1049) (2:6654) (1:2093)
Table 4: Computation time. OLS and GLS are our closed-form estimators that are ine¢ cient and
e¢ cient respectively. PSD-I and PSD-E are asymptotic least squares estimators of Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008) that are ine¢ cient (identity weighted) and e¢ cient respectively.
Our estimators are substantially faster to compute, and the distinction grows exponentially with
more parameters in the model. The reported CPU times also include the construction of the optimal
7There are other ways to vary the complexity of the game, e.g. by changing the number of potential actions and
states. However, the di¢ culty to solve and estimate such games increases signicantly as the games become more
complexed. Our design is chosen for its simplicity as it only requires us to solve a simple game multiple times.
8The simulation was performed using MATLAB (R2012a, 64 bit version) on a standard PC running on an Intel
Core (TM) 2 Duo 3.16 GHz processor with 4 GB RAM.
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weighting matrices, using numerical derivatives, for GLS and PSD-E. The procedure to compute
the optimal weighting matrices are similar for both (asymptotic least squares) estimators, so its
contribution in this setting can be approximated by comparing the CPU times of OLS and GLS
as M varies. Our results are model specic and we precaution against extrapolations as di¤erent
designs, as well as algorithms and softwares, will have di¤erent convergence properties for ALSEPSD.
Although a claim that closed-form estimation is generally a much simpler task is quite innocuous.
We also expect the computation time for ALSEPSD to grow at a faster rate with larger action and/or
state spaces for any xed M. Indeed another, perhaps even more important, numerical property of
our closed-form estimators is they are always global minimizers. In contrast, a numerical solution to
a general nonlinear optimization routine can be sensitive to the search algorithm, initial values, and
as well as the nature of the objective function.9
5 Conclusions and Possible Extensions
We have shown there can be some non-trivial computational gains in dening estimators that opti-
mize objective functions constructed in terms of expected payo¤s instead of choice probabilities for
the estimation of structural dynamic discrete choice problems. The most transparent advantages of
our approach follow from an opportunity to utilize familiar linear regression techniques, which arise
when the period payo¤ functions are modeled to have fully or partially linear-in-parameter struc-
ture. Since the class of estimators we propose is asymptotically equivalent to the unifying class of
estimators developed by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), there appears to be no theoretical
costs associated with our approach to simplify and improve the numerical aspects of the estimation
problem. Our estimators also perform well in Monte Carlo exercises in terms of speed and statistical
properties.
The computation advantages we describe in this paper accumulates beyond the procedure to
obtain a point estimate. For instance, resampling methods that are often used in practice to obtain
standard errors (or perhaps to improve nite sample properties) clearly would benet. The type of
objective functions we propose also naturally complements other research in the literature that aims
to improve the performance and/or scope of two-step methodologies. Two traditional criticisms of
two-step estimators are large nite sample bias (from the rst stage nonparametric estimation of
choice probabilities), and the inability to accommodate unobserved heterogeneity and state variables
that are persistent over time. For the former, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002,2007) propose an
9It is easy to construct a game where the (limiting) objective function dened using pseudo-probabilities has multiple
local minima such that some popular built-in optimization package produces di¤erent minimizers that depend on the
initial search value.
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iteration scheme that can improve the nite sample properties by imposing some structure for the rst
stage estimators; see Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008,2012) for further discussions and some theoretical
justications. At each iteration, the structural estimator can update the choice probabilities implied
by the pseudo-model that are then used to dene a new pseudo-likelihood function. To incorporate
our estimator, alternatively one can use the updated probabilities to construct an objective function
that denes the distance between the (updated) observed and implied expected payo¤s. For the
latter, the recent nonparametric identication results of Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) and Hu and
Shum (2012) show any two-step approach can also be readily applied to estimate a more general
dynamic model than the one considered in this paper.
Appendix
Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Under A1 to A3, S (;W) has a well-separated minimum at 0. Let
 () = Y   X () and b () = bY   bX (). Under A4, it follows that sup2 k ()k < 1 and
sup2
b ()   () = op (1). Then through some tedious algebra, of repeatedly adding nulls and
using properties of the matrix norm:
bS ; cW  S (;W) = b ()>cWb ()   ()>W ()
= 2 ()>W
b ()   ()+ op b ()   () ;
where the smaller order terms are uniform over under A2 - A3. Therefore sup2
 bS ; cW  S (;W) =
op (1), and consistency follows from a standard argument (e.g. see Newey and McFadden (1994)).
Proof of Theorem 2. Under our assumptions, b(cW) satises the rst order condition from
di¤erentiating (10) with respect to  with probability tending to 1, i.e.
0 =
0@ @ bX ()
@>

=b(cW)
1A> cW  bY   bX (b(cW))
holds with probability tending to 1. Since Y   X (0) = 0, by adding nulls, we have
bY   bX (b) = bU + E1 + E2
= bU  rX b(cW)  0+ op b(cW)  0 ;
where E1 =  

X (b(cW)) X (0) and E2 = bX (b(cW))   bX (0)   X (b(cW)) X (0), and the
second equality follows from A5 after applying mean value expansions to the terms in E1 and E2
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around 0. By adding nulls and using properties of matrix norm, since b(cW) = 0 + op (1), we also
have


@ bX ()
@>

=b(cW)
> cW  r>XW
 = op (1) under A2 and A5. Therefore b(cW) also satises
0 = r>XW
bU  rX b(cW)  0+ op 1p
N
+
b(cW)  0 ;
with probability tending to 1. Then it follows that
p
N
b(cW)  0 =  r>XWrX  1r>XW bU + op (1) :
An application of Slutskys theorem gives the result.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof for part (i) is standard (e.g. see Theorem 3.2 of Hansen
(1982)). We claim the optimal weighting matrix converges in the limit to 1. LetB =WrX
 rX>WrX  1
and C =  1rX
 rX> 1rX  1, so we have 
W = B>B and 
 1 = C>C. Using simple alge-
bra, it can be shown that B>B   C>C = (B   C)> (B   C)  0. For part (ii), it follows from
the proof of Theorem 2 that we did not use any specic information on cW beyond the fact that it
has a positive denite probability limit.
Representation Lemma
Proof of Lemma R. First we introduce some additional notations that build on the terms dened
in Section 2.2. Let vai;i =
 
vi;i (a; x
1) ; : : : ; vi;i
 
a; xJ

for all a, and vi;i =
 
v0i;i ; : : : ; v
K
i;i
>
, so
that vi;i is a J (K + 1) vector. Let a1:::aIi;i =
 
i;i (a1; : : : ; aI ; x
1) ; : : : ; i;i
 
a1; : : : ; aI ; x
J

for all
a1; : : : ; aI , and i;i =
 
0:::0i;i ; : : : ; 
K:::K
i;i
>
, so that i;i is a J (K + 1)
I  vector. For any k let: Id
denote an identity matrix of size d; Hi denote a block-diagonal matrix diag
 
H0i ; H
1
i ; : : : ; H
K
i

, where
Hai denotes a J  J matrix such that (Hai )jj0 = Pr

xt+1 = x
j0jxt = xj; ait = a

; M =

I(K+1)I 
M

whereM = (IJ   L) 1 and L denotes a JJ matrix such that (L)jj0 =  Pr

xt+1 = x
j0 jxt = xj

; R =2664
P 0:::0    PK:::K
...    ...
P 0:::0    PK:::K
3775 be a J (K + 1)I by J (K + 1)I matrix, where P a1:::aI = diag(P (a1; : : : ; aI jx1) ;
: : : ; P
 
a1; : : : ; aI jxJ

) with P (a1; : : : ; aI jx) = Pr[1;1 (sit) = a1; : : : ; I;I (sIt) = aI jxt = x] =
QI
j=1 Pj (ajjx), and let Ri =
2664
P 0:::0i0    PK:::Ki0
...    ...
P 0:::0iK    PK:::KiK
3775 be a J (K + 1) by J (K + 1)I matrix, where
P a1:::aIik = diag(Pik (a1; : : : ; aI jx1) ; : : : ; Pik
 
a1; : : : ; aI jxJ

) with Pik (a1; : : : ; aI jx) = Pr[1;1 (sit) =
a1; : : : ; i 1;i 1 (si 1t) = ai 1; i;i (sit) = k; i+1;i+1 (si+1t) = ai+1; I;I (sIt) = aI jxt = x] =
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Pi (kjx)
QI
j 6=i Pj (ajjx). Dene vai;i =
 
vi;i (a; x
1)  vi;i (0; x1) ; : : : ; vi;i
 
a; xJ
  vi;i  0; xJ for
all a > 0; and v =
 
v1i;i ; : : : ;v
K
i;i
>
. Let D denote the JKI  J (K + 1)J matrix that per-
forms the transformation Dv = v. Lastly, let vai =
 
vi (a; x
1) ; : : : ; vi
 
a; xJ

for all a, and dene
vi =
 
v0i ; : : : ; v
K
i
>
, so that vi = Dvi is a J (K + 1) vector. Then (6) immediately follows.
Asymptotic Equivalence of ALSEs
Proof of Proposition E. In the proof of this proposition we shall assume standard regularity
conditions hold throughout (i.e. we assume inverse of matrices exist, expected payo¤s and functions
are bounded and continuously di¤erentiable etc.). As seen from the proof of Theorem 2, under
standard regularity conditions b(cW) satises
b(cW) = 0 +  r>XWrX  1r>XW bU + op 1p
N

: (15)
Next we introduce ALSEPSD. It shall be useful to bear in mind the illustrative discussion in
Section 2.1. We rst dene some additional notations that build on the terms dened in Section 2.3.
Let P =
 
P>1 ; : : : ;P
>
I
>
and P =
 
P>1;1 ; : : : ;P
>
I;I
>
. Similarly, let v =
 
v>1 ; : : : ;v
>
I
>
and
v =
 
v>1;1 ; : : : ;v
>
I;I
>
. Then, by Hotz and Millers inversion there exists an invertible and
continuously di¤erentiable map   such that P =   (v) and P =   (v). In particular
P =

 1 (v1)
> ; : : : ; I (vI)
>
>
; and
P =

 1 (v1;1)
> ; : : : ; I (vI;I )
>
>
;
where  i is the inverse of i, which is dened in the text. Therefore, in terms of Y and X (),
v  v = Y   X () .
Thus P and P are also deterministic functions of the preliminary estimators (that we denoted by
0). We denote the estimators of P and P by eP and bP respectively, and these estimators are
constructed based on the same b that dene bX and bY. Note that, although P = P0 , eP and bP0 are
generally di¤erent. An ALSEPSD, denoted by bPSD(bV), is dened as the minimizer of
min
2
eP  bP> bV eP  bP ;
for some bV that converges in probability to positive denite matrix V (cf. equation (21) on page
915 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)). Under appropriate regularity conditions, it is
straightforward to show, analogous to our Theorem 2, that
p
N
bPSD(bV)  0 d! N (0;	V) :
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For a rst order asymptotic equivalence, it su¢ ces to only consider the local asymptotic properties
of ALSEPSD around 0. Let rP denote @P@>

=0
. An ALSEPSD satises
0 =  r>PV
eP P  bPbPSD(V)  P0+ op 1pN

:
As the problem is smooth, it can be shown generally that the condition above simplies further to
0 =  r>PV
eP P  bP0  P0 + PbPSD(V)  P0+ op 1pN

:
So that we have
bPSD (V) = 0 +  r>PVrP 1r>PV eP P  (bP0  P0)+ op 1p
N

:
By chain rule rP equals r rX , where r  denotes the Jacobian of   evaluated at v, and @v@>

=0
equals rX . Thus, we can write
bPSD (V) = 0 +  r>Xr> Vr rX  1r>Xr> V eP P  (bP0  P0)+ op 1p
N

= 0 +
 r>Xr> Vr rX  1r>Xr> Vr  bU + op 1p
N

;
where the last equality follows from linearizing eP   P   (bP0   P0) in terms of bY   bX (0). By
dening WV = r> Vr , we have
bPSD (V) = 0 +  r>XWVrX  1r>XWV bU + op 1p
N

: (16)
Therefore, by comparing (15) and (16), bPSD (V) has the same asymptotic distribution as b (WV).
In particular, let V denote the e¢ cient weighting matrix for ALSEPSD so that 	V  	V for
any positive denite matrix V. Therefore the e¢ cient ALSEPSD, denoted by bPSD, has the same
asymptotic distribution as b (WV) withWV = r> Vr . Then it must hold, by Theorem 3(i), that

 1  	V since 
 1 is the lower variance bound. To complete the proof, an identical argument
can be made in the reverse direction. It is easy to show that any b (W) that satises (15) also has the
same asymptotic distribution as bPSD (VW), where VW = r>  1Wr  1 (cf. WV), and r  1 denotes
the Jacobian of   1 evaluated at P (that equals (r ) 1 by the inverse function theorem). We omit
further details to avoid repetition. Thus, it follows that 	V  
 1 , hence we can also conclude
that 	V = 
 1 .
In summary:
p
N
b(W)  0 = pN bPSD(VW)  0+ op 1p
N

with VW = r>  1Wr  1 , (17)
p
N
bPSD(V)  0 = pN b(WV)  0+ op 1p
N

with WV = r> Vr ,
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and (V ;W) can be replaced by any consistent estimators (bV ;cW). Therefore our estimator and
ALSEPSD can always be constructed to have the same asymptotic distribution and achieve the
same lower variance bound.
References
[1] Ackerberg, D., L. Benkard, S. Berry, and A. Pakes (2005), Econometric Tools for Analyzing
Market Outcome,Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 6, eds. J. Heckman and E. Leamer. North-
Holland.
[2] Aguirregabiria, V., and P. Mira (2002): Swapping Nested Fixed Point Algorithm: a Class of
Estimators for Discrete Markov Decision Models,Econometrica, 70, 1519-1543.
[3] Aguirregabiria, V. and P. Mira (2007): Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games,
Econometrica, 75, 1-53.
[4] Aguirregabiria, V., and P. Mira (2010): Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models: A Sur-
vey,Journal of Econometrics, 156, 38-67
[5] Aguirregabiria, V. and J. Suzuki (2013): Identication and Counterfactuals in Dynamic Models
of Market Entry and Exit,Working Paper, University of Toronto.
[6] Amemiya, T. (1985): Advanced Econometrics, Harvard University Press.
[7] Bajari, P. and H. Hong (2006): Semiparametric Estimation of a Dynamic Game of Incomplete
Information,NBER Technical Working Paper 320.
[8] Bajari, P., C.L. Benkard, and J. Levin (2007): Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect
Competition,Econometrica, 75, 1331-1370.
[9] Bajari, P., V. Chernozhukov, H. Hong and D. Nekipelov (2009): Identication and E¢ cient
Estimation of a Dynamic Discrete Game,Working paper, University of Minnesota.
[10] Chamberlain, G. (1982): Multivariate Regression Models for Panel Data,Journal of Econo-
metrics, 18, 5-46.
[11] Collard-Wexler, A. (2013): Demand Fluctuations and Plant Turnover in the Ready-Mix Con-
crete Industry, forthcoming in Econometrica.
[12] Davidson, R. and J.G. MacKinnon (1993): Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, Oxford
University Press.
30
[13] Egesdal, M., Z. Lai and C. Su (2013): Estimating Dynamic Discrete-Choice Games of Incom-
plete Information,Working Paper, University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
[14] Frisch, R. and F.V. Waugh (1933): Partial Time Regressions as Compared with Individual
Trends,Econometrica, 1, 387-401.
[15] Gourieroux, C. and A. Monfort (1995): Statistics and Econometric Models: Volume 1, General
Concepts, Estimation, Prediction and Algorithms, Themes in Modern Econometrics, Cambridge
University Press.
[16] Hansen, L.P. (1982): Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators,
Econometrica, 50, 1029 -1054.
[17] Hotz, V., and R.A. Miller (1993): Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of
Dynamic Models,Review of Economic Studies, 60, 497-531.
[18] Hotz, V., R.A. Miller, S. Smith and J. Smith (1994): A Simulation Estimator for Dynamic
Models of Discrete Choice,Review of Economic Studies, 61, 265-289.
[19] Hu, Y. andM. Shum (2012): Nonparametric Identication of Dynamic Models with Unobserved
State Variables,Journal of Econometrics, 171, 32-44.
[20] Kasahara, H. and K. Shimotsu (2008): Pseudo-Likelihood Estimation and Bootstrap Inference
for Structural Discrete Markov Decision Models,Journal of Econometrics, 146, 92-106.
[21] Kasahara, H. and K. Shimotsu (2009), Nonparametric Identication of Finite Mixture Models
of Dynamic Discrete Choices,Econometrica, 77, 135-175.
[22] Kasahara, H. and K. Shimotsu (2012), Sequential Estimation of Structural Models with a Fixed
Point Constraint,Econometrica, 80, 2303-2319
[23] Li, Q. and J.S. Racine (2006): Nonparametric Econometrics, Princeton University Press.
[24] Magnac, M. and D. Thesmar (2002): Identifying Dynamic Discrete Decision Processes,Econo-
metrica, 70, 801-816.
[25] Matzkin, R.L. (1991): Semiparametric Estimation of Monotone and Concave Utility Functions
for Polychotomous Choice Models,Econometrica, 59, 13151327.
[26] Newey, W.K. and D.L. McFadden (1994): Large Sample Estimation and Hypothesis Testing,
Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 4, eds. R.F. Engle and D. McFadden. North-Holland.
31
[27] Norets, A. and S. Takahashi (2013): On the Surjectivity of the Mapping Between Utilities and
Choice Probabilities,Quantitative Economics, 4, 149155.
[28] Pakes, A., M. Ostrovsky, and S. Berry (2007): Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete
Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Example),RAND Journal of Economics, 38, 373-399.
[29] Pesendorfer, M., and P. Schmidt-Dengler (2008): Asymptotic Least Squares Estimator for
Dynamic Games,Review of Economics Studies, 75, 901-928.
[30] Ryan, S. P. (2012): The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry,
Econometrica, 80, 1019-1061.
[31] Rust, J. (1994): Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes,Handbook of Economet-
rics, vol. 4, eds. R.F. Engle and D. McFadden. North-Holland.
[32] Rust, J. (1996): Numerical Dynamic Programming in Economics,Handbook of Computational
Economics, vol. 1, eds. H.M. Aumann, D.A. Kendrick and J. Rust. Elsevier.
[33] Srisuma, S. (2013a): Identication in Markov Decision Models,Working Paper, University of
Cambridge.
[34] Srisuma, S. (2013b): Minimum Distance Estimators for Dynamic Games,Quantitative Eco-
nomics, 4, 549-583.
[35] Srisuma, S. and O.B. Linton (2012): Semiparametric Estimation of Markov Decision Processes
with Continuous State Space,Journal of Econometrics, 166, 320-341.
[36] Tamer, E. (2003), Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model withMultiple Equilibria,
Review of Economic Studies, 70, 147165.
32
